Drift Americas · Study, 14 September 2026

Internet disruptions abroad: what can your eSIM actually protect?

The Americas combine long-distance itineraries with very different network dependencies. This edition examines the United States, Canada, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. The examples range from operator faults to a targeted platform block and an urban power event. They are not a league table of country reliability, and a problem recorded in one city or ASN is not extended to an entire continent.

The findings, before buying another eSIM

An eSIM does not by itself prevent a tower, power or backhaul failure. It can provide an alternative when it changes a dependency that is still working, but a second brand, foreign IP or network list does not prove independence. This edition separates documented incidents, official notices and catalogue declarations.

5editorially selected destinations
5documented incidents, not a national total
61national fixed-data package references
7declared country / network / exit configurations

0 scheduled notices and 0 continuity cases are counted separately. The incident count belongs to this corpus; it does not measure annual outage frequency.

Five destinations, not five countries ranked by risk

United States, Canada, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina

The selection is editorial: documented examples, usefulness for trip planning and presence in the supplier’s technical catalogue. It is neither a top-five tourism ranking nor a random sample. An incident absent from this page is not proof of a fault-free network. The corpus is non-exhaustive and does not compare annual availability between countries.

Where the buyer lives does not by itself determine the network used abroad. Regionalisation changes destinations and explanations; it does not manufacture new measurements. Historical facts about the same country retain their date and limitations across editions.

An eSIM provides access to an infrastructure chain

  1. Phone and installed profile
  2. Tower and visited mobile network
  3. Roaming agreements and transport
  4. Internet exit and DNS
  5. Final application or website

The downloadable profile replaces a SIM’s physical medium, not the towers or their power supply. If radio access fails, a data exit in another country does not restore that access. If only one application fails, maps and other messaging services may still work. Diagnosis needs to identify the failed dependency.

Not every “outage” means the same thing

FailureWhat an alternative may changeWhat an eSIM does not establish
Power, tower, backhaulAnother access path with working infrastructurePhysical immunity from having a foreign IP
Operator faultA genuinely different MNO, if authorised and reachableTwo stores equal two independent networks
DNS / DNSSECA different resolver may change some failures, not allA 5G icon guarantees domain resolution
Application blockingTreatment may vary by network, route and serviceGuaranteed access or exemption from local rules
Quota / expiry / incorrect APNChecking the profile and plan conditionsEvery data error is a country outage

Case register and nature of the evidence

Destination / dateCategoryObserved scopeEvidence and window
United States
2024-02-22
Network incidentAT&T / AS7018, several US citiesAbout eight hours in Cloudflare's summary, not eight hours for every subscriber.
Cloudflare Radar: Q1 2024 Internet disruption summary
Canada
2025-05-21
Network incidentBell / AS577, Ontario and QuébecTraffic returned to its expected level in about one hour; Bell confirmed full restoration at 15:00 UTC.
Cloudflare Radar: Q2 2025 Internet disruption summary
Colombia
2025-08-06
Network incidentClaro-related AS10620, AS14080 and AS2661116:45 to 17:20 UTC, about 35 minutes of severely degraded traffic.
Cloudflare Radar: Q3 2025 Internet disruption summary
Brazil
2024-08-31
Service blockingX / twitter.com on more than 25 tested networksSignals from 31 August 2024. Return authorised on 8 October; the OONI finding covers through 11 October.
OONI: Brazil blocked Twitter/X · Supremo Tribunal Federal: STF autoriza o retorno imediato do X
Argentina
2026-01-15
Power / infrastructureBuenos Aires; AS7303, AS27747, AS1681420:30 to 22:30 UTC, about two hours of observed traffic reduction.
Cloudflare Radar: Q1 2026 Internet disruption summary

Intervals are described only as far as the source permits. Traffic windows, blocking periods and notices are not added to produce “hours without Internet”. Each record states its scope; provider statements and traffic observations are different kinds of evidence.

The five destinations, case by case

United States

2024-02-22 · Network incident

Cloudflare documents an AT&T disruption in several cities on 22 February 2024. Observed traffic in Chicago fell around 45% against the previous week; in Dallas, around 18%.

Limit: Traffic reductions are not percentages of disconnected eSIMs. Tourist profiles and the whole United States were not tested.

Cloudflare Radar: Q1 2024 Internet disruption summary

The catalogue declares 20 national fixed-data references and 1 network/exit configurations for this destination. These are not 20 independent networks.

Explore the destination and current plans: United States

Canada

2025-05-21 · Network incident

Following a router update, Cloudflare observed Bell traffic falling by up to 70% against the previous week, starting around 13:15 UTC.

Limit: An ASN can carry fixed and mobile connections. The traffic window and the full-restoration statement are different measurements.

Cloudflare Radar: Q2 2025 Internet disruption summary

The catalogue declares 16 national fixed-data references and 3 network/exit configurations for this destination. These are not 16 independent networks.

Explore the destination and current plans: Canada

Colombia

2025-08-06 · Network incident

Cloudflare detected traffic falling by more than two thirds against the previous week across three networks associated with Claro Colombia. The summary does not establish a cause.

Limit: This is not a nationwide outage and does not show that every eSIM using Claro failed.

Cloudflare Radar: Q3 2025 Internet disruption summary

The catalogue declares 8 national fixed-data references and 1 network/exit configurations for this destination. These are not 8 independent networks.

Explore the destination and current plans: Colombia

Brazil

2024-08-31 · Service blocking

OONI found signs of X blocking on more than 25 tested networks, involving DNS interference or IP blocking depending on the network. The STF authorised its return on 8 October 2024.

Limit: This is a service block, not the disappearance of Internet access. The court date, restoration by network and measurement coverage must remain distinct.

OONI: Brazil blocked Twitter/X · Supremo Tribunal Federal: STF autoriza o retorno imediato do X

The catalogue declares 9 national fixed-data references and 1 network/exit configurations for this destination. These are not 9 independent networks.

Explore the destination and current plans: Brazil

Argentina

2026-01-15 · Power / infrastructure

Cloudflare documented traffic reductions at Telecom Argentina, Telecentro and IPLAN during a summer power outage in Buenos Aires.

Limit: The scope is a city and specific networks, not all of Argentina. Aggregate traffic recovery does not identify an eSIM profile's restoration minute.

Cloudflare Radar: Q1 2026 Internet disruption summary

The catalogue declares 8 national fixed-data references and 1 network/exit configurations for this destination. These are not 8 independent networks.

Explore the destination and current plans: Argentina

What the eSIM Access technical catalogue reveals

The snapshot was collected on 13 September 2026 (2026-09-13T11:05:12.815Z). The full catalogue contained 3046 references. This technical panel retains 61 unique codes whose location equals the destination ISO and dataType = 1. Regional bundles and daily or other product classes are excluded from this panel.

DestinationReferences offering coverage, overlappingNational fixed-dataCountry / network / exit configurations
United States82201
Canada76163
Colombia4681
Brazil6491
Argentina6081

The coverage column includes national products and products listing the country in a region. It is not added into a unique total: the same code can cover several destinations. Configurations are grouped by country, ipExport value and a sorted set of MNO names/network types. Different durations and allowances can share one configuration.

Advertised networks, without a switching promise

DestinationDeclared MNO and technologyipExport exit, unverifiedGrouped package codes
United StatesVerizon (5G)
AT&T (5G)
US20
CanadaRogers Wireless (5G)US9
CanadaBell (5G)
Telus (5G)
SaskTel (5G)
NL/FR6
CanadaTelus (5G)CA1
ColombiaClaro (4G)SG8
BrazilClaro (5G)
TIM (5G)
Vivo (5G)
BR9
ArgentinaMovistar (4G)
Personal (5G)
UK8

In this panel, 18 references list one MNO name and 43 list more than one. Counting names does not establish priority, simultaneous coverage, manual selection or automatic switching during a fault. No brand is assigned a backup capability without testing the purchased profile.

A commercial name may represent a merged brand or share infrastructure with another name. Retaining two literal names in the data does not imply two separate radio networks. The list is published as a dated supplier declaration, not an independent certification.

IP exit: a useful clue, not a route measurement

ipExport is retained literally. It may identify a country or a broad region such as Europe. It cannot reconstruct every hop, identify the profile APN, confirm an IMSI or establish the ASN the buyer will use. It also does not identify the country of a speedtest server.

The speedtest server is the test’s destination, not necessarily the connection’s exit. Publishing an observed route requires recording the public IP, ASN and multiple geolocation sources alongside the connected MNO, time, device and test. Where possible, traceroute adds context; hidden hops or conflicting geolocation require keeping the uncertainty.

An exit outside the destination may change latency or the filtering encountered by a connection, but it does not guarantee greater speed or access to blocked services. This is a technical hypothesis for future tests, not a result observed during the incidents in this corpus.

Why a 5G label is not enough

Advertised technology describes a contractual or network possibility, not the state of a particular connection. The handset, bands, area, roaming and plan conditions all matter. If speed says 3G/4G while locationNetworkList advertises 5G, both fields remain in the data; the contradiction is not resolved by inventing a capability.

A quality comparison requires the same device, location and time window, with provider order alternated. Observed 4G/5G connection, latency, jitter, loss, download and upload need to be recorded alongside practical tasks. One fast speedtest does not establish availability during a fault, and this study publishes no provider podium.

A backup can also expire or require Internet

An alternative that is not yet installed may depend on the failed connection to download its profile. Before travelling, confirm receipt, compatibility, instructions and activation mechanism. eSIM Access documentation distinguishes installation-triggered activation from first connection at the destination; the actual code for each reference is retained without generalising to every brand.

Validity is not assumed to pause during an outage, and data or days are not assumed to be restored automatically. Hotspot, refund or FUP rules are not inferred from an MNO list. These conditions require the exact product terms and, for real-world validation, a record of purchase, installation, connection and expiry.

eSIM Access: Plan Activation Mechanisms & Product Classification

How to prepare a backup that changes a dependency

  1. Save maps, tickets, the address, reservation number and accommodation contact offline. A documentary backup remains useful even when every reachable network fails.
  2. Identify the MNO behind the main and backup plans, not just the seller’s logo. Ask whether manual selection of another network is allowed and retain the exact answer.
  3. Install over a stable connection only when the activation rules allow it without losing days. Keep instructions without publishing QR codes, ICCIDs or credentials.
  4. During a fault, compare at least two unrelated services. If maps work but one application does not, avoid treating the problem as the loss of all data.
  5. Check allowance and expiry, briefly toggle airplane mode, and inspect the registered network and instructed APN. Do not delete the profile as a first step: reinstallation may require authorisation or connectivity.
  6. Use Wi-Fi or another available network where appropriate, without assuming every Wi-Fi path is independent. Follow official notices and avoid testing critical services or generating heavy traffic during an emergency.

For the Americas: long distances and time zones make the timestamp and city especially important. Do not extend Buenos Aires observations to all Argentina, or AT&T city observations to every US network. Check each country in a regional plan rather than assuming that “Americas” includes every stop. Keep a second contact method that does not require buying or installing another profile during the incident.

What field tests contribute and what is still missing

Existing field measurements describe a connection at its test location and time. They are not retrospectively converted into measurements during a historical fault. Future Thailand tests can couple registered network, IP exit and speedtest, but cannot establish what happened in Canada or Spain.

Future recordComparison condition
Purchase and validityOne profile per provider: purchase, installation, first connection, usage and expiry recorded separately with timestamps.
Route and qualitySame device and site; repeated sessions and alternated order; IP/ASN with each speedtest, without treating the server as the exit.
Support and refundDocument response and resolution. A second profile only if the refund scenario requires an unused one.

Browse published field measurements

Reproducible protocol and counting rules

  1. Fix the period and five destinations before counting. Retain primary sources: operators, regulators, technical registries, traffic observatories or blocking measurements. Exclude unverified rumours.
  2. Create one episode/country record with date, scope, category, source and limitation. One blackout affecting Spain and Portugal creates two country records, not two independent causes.
  3. Distinguish traffic observation, blocking measurement, operator statement, scheduled notice and continuity. A traffic reduction against the previous week is not the percentage of disconnected users.
  4. Query /open/package/list using the existing integrated client without buying profiles. Export the selected technical fields; exclude wholesale costs, secrets and subscriber data.
  5. Filter national references by location exactly equal to the ISO and dataType = 1. Deduplicate by packageCode. Group configurations by country + literal ipExport + sorted MNO/technology.
  6. Keep the original catalogue timestamp separate from the editorial review date. Publish JSON and linked sources. Do not fill missing fields with assumptions.

Panel formula: reference count = cardinality of unique packageCode values after filtering. Configuration count = sum of within-country groups. Incident count = records not classified as notice or continuity. No denominator of observed hours is calculated, so there is no availability rate.

What this edition cannot establish

  • It does not identify the country with the most outages or an annual traveller-risk rate.
  • It does not rank providers by resilience. One wholesaler’s catalogue does not represent the whole market.
  • It does not verify automatic switching, MNO priority, hotspot, APN, IMSI, ASN or the profile’s actual route.
  • It does not assign an ASN’s traffic reduction or duration to each user. Networks and devices do not have the same observation scope.
  • It does not assume every blocked service becomes accessible through a foreign IP, and does not recommend evading local rules.
  • It does not assess emergency calls, SMS or rescue availability on a data-only eSIM. It is not a real-time safety tool.

Commercial transparency

Drift Americas sells eSIMs and uses eSIM Access as a supplier. Emmanuel Cerisola runs this activity and publication. The catalogue is a supplier declaration, not an independent audit of its network agreements. Drift Americas is neither certified nor given an advantage over other sellers.

No outages were induced, no profiles were bought for this edition, and no support or refund requests were sent. Customer tests will be published separately when evidence exists. No synthetic score or index is added to these data.

Frequently asked questions

Does an eSIM work during a blackout?

Only if its access and infrastructure chain remain operational. The eSIM format does not power towers or repair backhaul. This corpus does not measure each profile’s service duration during a blackout.

Are two eSIM brands two backup networks?

Not necessarily. They can depend on the same MNO, wholesaler or exit. Check the exact plan and observe the profile rather than comparing logos.

Does a foreign IP mean data avoids the country?

No. The phone still uses local radio access. ipExport is a declaration; IP geolocation and traceroute add observations, but can leave uncertainty.

Does 5G mean better availability?

It cannot be concluded from a label. Power, DNS or application faults can prevent use even when the handset displays 5G. Comparable tests are required.

Are scheduled notices treated as measured outages?

No. They are shown separately with their category and announced window. Actual implementation per eSIM was not measured. Continuity cases are also excluded from the incident count.

Which provider withstands outages best?

This publication cannot answer that. The technical panel comes from one supplier and contains no fault tests using purchased profiles. No winner is invented.

Primary sources and traceability

  1. Q1 2024 Internet disruption summary · Cloudflare Radar
  2. Q2 2025 Internet disruption summary · Cloudflare Radar
  3. Q3 2025 Internet disruption summary · Cloudflare Radar
  4. Brazil blocked Twitter/X · OONI
  5. STF autoriza o retorno imediato do X · Supremo Tribunal Federal

    Official indexed notice; direct retrieval blocked (403) during the check.

  6. Q1 2026 Internet disruption summary · Cloudflare Radar

Editorial review: 14 September 2026. Source pages may be updated; the episode date remains in each record. The catalogue retains its 13 September timestamp and is not presented as a publication-day collection.

Data to cite and download

Suggested citation: Drift Americas, “Internet disruptions abroad: what can your eSIM actually protect?”, Americas edition, 14 September 2026. Retain the catalogue date, five destinations and distinction between incidents, notices and continuity.

https://driftamericas.com/data-index/internet-disruptions-esim/

Original counts and analysis may be cited with attribution and a link. Third-party measurements and statements retain their own attribution; this page does not relicense their content. The technical JSON excludes wholesale costs, credentials and subscriber profiles.